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for the central bank’s inflation target as a tool of macroeconomic stabilization. They show that 
even when the zero lower bound is not binding, a prudent central bank will need to match every 
decrease in the natural real interest rate with an equal increase in the target rate of inflation in 
order to stabilize the risk of the economy falling into a deflationary spiral, which is an acute case 
of simultaneously falling output and inflation in which the economy’s self-correcting forces are 
inactive. 
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Recent discussions of secular stagnation have drawn attention to the steady decrease in the 
natural real interest rate in the United States since the 1980s.
1
 In this article, we investigate how 
a nation’s central bank should respond to decreases in the natural real interest rate when the zero 
lower bound on nominal interest rates (ZLB) is potentially binding. In particular, if output is at 
the full-employment level and inflation is at the central bank’s inflation target, should the central 
bank feel free to ignore decreases in the natural real interest rate? Our answer is no. We argue 
that decreases in the natural real interest rate increase an economy’s vulnerability to the 
deflationary spiral, which is an acute case of simultaneously falling output and inflation in which 
the economy’s self-correcting forces become inactive. We also show that a central bank can 
neutralize this danger by simply raising its inflation target. 
Intermediate macroeconomics textbooks do not discuss what policy makers should do in 
response to changes in the natural real interest rate.
2
 We hope to show that a standard textbook 
model and standard graphical techniques can be used to present this new aspect of 
macroeconomic stabilization to students. We work out the comparative static effects of a fall in 
the natural real interest rate in the dynamic Aggregate Demand–Aggregate Supply (DAD–DAS) 
model of short-run macroeconomic dynamics in Mankiw (2013, Chapter 15), a widely-used 
intermediate macroeconomics textbook, modified, as in Buttet and Roy (2014), to formally 
include the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. 
In Mankiw’s DAD–DAS model, equilibrium output and inflation are determined at the 
intersection of two curves: a negatively-sloped dynamic aggregate demand curve and a 
positively-sloped dynamic aggregate supply curve. And, irrespective of the equilibrium levels of 
inflation and output at a given date, the economy converges over time to the model’s unique 
long-run equilibrium, in which output is at the full-employment level and inflation is at the 
 
3 
central bank’s target rate. However, when the explicit requirement that the nominal interest rate 
set by the central bank must be non-negative is added, Buttet and Roy (2014) show that the 
familiar negatively-sloped aggregate demand curve becomes a kinked curve with a 
negatively-sloped segment (when the ZLB is nonbinding) and a positively-sloped segment (when 
the ZLB is binding).
3
 And, this leads to two (rather than one) long-run equilibria: (1) the stable 
equilibrium discussed above and (2) an unstable equilibrium at which the ZLB is binding and the 
slightest shock can set off a deflationary spiral.
4
 
The equilibrium inflation rate at any given date turns out to be the crucial determinant of 
the economy’s subsequent destiny. If inflation at a given date is higher than the negative of the 
natural real interest rate, then all’s well: the economy converges to the stable long-run 
equilibrium. If, on the other hand, inflation at a given date drops below the negative of the 
natural real interest rate, the economy enters a deflationary spiral. So, inflation’s danger level is 
equal to the negative of the natural real interest rate; inflation must be kept above this danger 
level at all costs. 
Now consider an economy that is at the stable long-run equilibrium, with inflation equal 
to the central bank’s target inflation rate and higher than the danger level. An unfavorable 
demand shock (or a favorable inflation shock) could reduce inflation from the central bank’s 
target inflation rate to below the danger level, thereby initiating a deflationary spiral. This is why 
the job of the central bank in our model is no longer restricted to the standard one of achieving 
full employment and low inflation. The central bank must also do what it can to reduce the risk 
of a shock-induced deflationary spiral. And this is why a decrease in the natural real interest rate 
makes macroeconomic stabilization harder. When the natural real interest rate decreases, the 
negative of it increases, raising the danger level of inflation closer to the central bank’s target 
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rate. Consequently, the possibility that a shock would cause inflation to fall from the central 
bank’s target rate (in the stable equilibrium) to below the danger level becomes more likely.
5
 
Luckily, the very nature of the danger points to a way of neutralizing it. If the risk of a 
deflationary spiral has increased because the danger level of inflation has increased and comes 
closer to the target rate, an obvious solution is to raise the target rate too. We show that any 
increase in the economy’s vulnerability to the deflationary spiral can be neutralized by an 
increase in the central bank’s inflation target.
6
 If the natural real interest rate decreases by a 
certain amount and if the central bank responds by increasing the target inflation by the same 
amount, then the gap between the inflation target and the negative of the natural real interest rate 
would remain unaffected and therefore the chance that a shock of a given size would precipitate 
a deflationary spiral would stay unchanged.
7
 
While it is fairly obvious that when the zero lower bound is binding, a central bank that 
wishes to maintain full employment would need to increase its target inflation rate in lockstep 
with decreases in the natural real interest rate, the analysis outlined above shows that even when 
the zero lower bound is not binding, a prudent central bank will need to match every decrease in 
the natural real interest rate with an equal increase in the target inflation rate in order to keep the 
economy’s vulnerability to the deflationary spiral from increasing.
8
 Intermediate 
macroeconomics textbooks do not address this issue. We hope to show that a standard textbook 
model and standard graphical techniques can be used to present this new aspect of 
macroeconomic stabilization to students. 
Note that our focus on the natural real interest rate is related to the current research and 
debate on secular stagnation (e.g., Eggertsson and Mehrotra 2014). In an address to the National 
Association for Business Economics that is often cited in discussions of secular stagnation, Larry 
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Summers refered to “changes in the structure of the economy that have led to a significant shift 
in the natural balance between savings and investment, causing a decline in the equilibrium or 
normal real rate of interest that is associated with full employment” (Summers 2014a).
9
 
However, economists do not agree on how to define secular stagnation, what causes it, or 
whether it exists at all (Eichengreen 2014).
10
 Our article shows how macroeconomic 
stabilization is affected by secular stagnation as defined by Summers. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section reviews historical data 
about real interest rates and the output gap for the United States in the last thirty years and 
proposes a simple way to estimate the natural real interest rate for use in intermediate 
macroeconomics courses. In the following section, we present the DAD–DAS model of Mankiw 
(2013) modified to include the ZLB constraint. We derive the kinked demand curve and 
characterize the model’s long-run equilibrium and study their stability. In subsequent two 
sections, we show how decreases in the natural real interest rate increases the economy’s 
vulnerability to a deflationary spiral and how raising the central bank’s target inflation can 
insulate the economy from this danger. We conclude by discussing some issues not formally 
modeled in this article. 
MOTIVATING EVIDENCE 
A salient feature of bond markets, both in the United States and abroad, is that real interest rates 
and the natural real interest rate have been in a downward trend for the past thirty years (King 
and Low 2014; Barsky, Justiniano, and Melosi 2014; Laubach and Williams 2003).
11
 While real 
interest rates can be easily inferred from inflation and nominal yield data, the natural real interest 
rate is a theoretical construct that is not directly observable and needs to be estimated.
12
 Here we 
propose a model, simple enough to be included in intermediate macroeconomics courses, to 
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estimate the natural real interest rate. We run a linear regression between real interest rates, tr , 
and the output gap, tY∆
13
: 
 ttt Yr εββ +∆+ 10=  (1) 
where the disturbance term tε  is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time. We 
interpret the estimate of the intercept 0β  as an estimate of the natural real interest rate, because 
0β  estimates the real interest rate when output gap is zero. 
We present estimates of 0β  and 1β  for each decade between 1981 and 2013 in table 1. 
While our model is much simpler than Laubach and Williams (2003), we too find that the natural 




[Insert table 1 about here.] 
In the next section, we present a theoretical macroeconomic model of the business cycle where 
the ZLB is potentially binding. Later, we use this model to analyze the impact of a decline in the 
natural interest rate on inflation and output. 
A MODEL OF MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS 
As we saw in the previous section, the natural real interest rate has been decreasing in the United 
States since the 1980s. We wish to show that a decrease in the natural real interest rate has 
important implications for macroeconomic stabilization, and that these implications can be easily 
discussed in undergraduate intermediate macroeconomics courses. To that end, we analyze in the 
next section the comparative static effects of a decrease in the natural real interest rate using a 
modified version of Mankiw’s DAD–DAS model that incorporates the zero lower bound on the 
 
7 
nominal interest rate. That modified DAD–DAS model—discussed in Buttet and Roy (2014)—is 
summarized in this section. 
The Kinked DAD Curve 
The DAD curve of the DAD–DAS model is shown in figure 1. Aggregate demand is inversely 
related to inflation when the ZLB is nonbinding, but directly related to inflation when the ZLB is 
binding. 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
To understand the kinked shape of the DAD curve, we need to look at the equations that drive 
Mankiw’s DAD–DAS model. Goods market equilibrium in period t  is given by 
 .)(= tttt rYY ερα +−⋅−  (2) 
Here tY  denotes the natural or long-run level of output, tr  is the real interest rate, ρ  is the 
natural or long-run real interest rate, α  is a positive parameter representing the responsiveness 
of aggregate expenditure to the real interest rate and tε  represents demand shocks. Under fiscal 
stimulus (an increase in government expenditure or a decrease in taxes), tε  is positive; under 
fiscal austerity, tε  is negative.
15
 
The ex ante real interest rate in period t  is determined by the Fisher equation and is 
equal to the nominal interest rate ti  minus the inflation expected for the next period: 
 .= 1+− tttt Eir π  (3) 
The expected inflation in the above equation is assumed to follow adaptive expectations: 
 .=1 tttE ππ +  (4) 
The nominal interest rate in the Fisher equation (3) is assumed to be set by the central 
bank according to its monetary policy rule. This rule is )()(= * ttYttt YYi −⋅+−⋅++ θππθρπ π , 
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where *π  is the central bank’s inflation target, and the parameters πθ  and Yθ  are 
non-negative. But the nominal interest rate must obey the zero lower bound (ZLB): that is, it 
needs to be non-negative. Therefore, the generalized monetary policy rule is: 
 )}.()({0,max= * ttYttt YYi −⋅+−⋅++ θππθρπ π  (5) 
Figure 1 shows the border that separates the ( ttY π, )-outcomes for which the ZLB is not 
binding from the ( ttY π, )-outcomes for which the ZLB is binding. Algebraically, the monetary 
policy rule (5) implies that the ZLB border satisfies 
 0.=)()( * ttYtt YY −⋅+−⋅++ θππθρπ π  (6) 
Above this border, the ZLB is not binding and the nominal interest rate set by the central bank is 
positive ( 0>)()(= * ttYttt YYi −⋅+−⋅++ θππθρπ π ). On the border, the central bank chooses a 
zero interest rate, but does so willingly, and not because it wanted a negative rate but could not 
choose it. Below the border, the ZLB is binding ( 0=ti ). 



















= *  (7) 
when the ZLB is nonbinding, and 
 .)(= tttt YY ερπα ++⋅+  (8) 
when the ZLB is binding. 
Equation (7) is graphed in figure 1 as the negatively-sloped segment of the DAD curve 
above the ZLB border, which is where the ZLB is not binding. And equation (8) is graphed as 
the positively-sloped segment of the DAD curve below the ZLB border, which is where the ZLB 
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is binding. In this way, the introduction of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate 
yields a kinked DAD curve. 
The positively-sloped segment is meant to capture the idea that falling inflation is a 
special nightmare at the zero lower bound. As 0=ti , any decline in current inflation ( ↓tπ ) 
means an increase in the current real interest rate ( ↑−−−− + tttttttt iEir ππππ =0=== 1 ). The 




The kinked DAD curve in figure 1 has been drawn assuming that the demand shock is 
absent ( 0=tε ). Consequently, 
*= ππ t  and tt YY =  satisfy equation (7). This is point O  in 
the figure. Similarly, it is straightforward to check that ρπ −=t  and tt YY =  satisfy equation 
(8). This is point D  in the figure. Outcomes O  and D  will play an important role in our 
discussion of the model’s equilibrium below. 
The DAS Curve 
Coming now to aggregate supply, inflation, tπ , is determined in Mankiw’s DAD–DAS model 
by a conventional Phillips Curve augmented to include the role of expected inflation, ttE π1− , 
and an exogenous inflation shock, tν : 
 tttttt YYE νφππ +−⋅+− )(= 1  (9) 
where φ  is a positive parameter. 
When adaptive expectations (4) is substituted into the Phillips Curve (9), we get 
Mankiw’s dynamic aggregate supply or DAS curve: 
 .)(= 1 ttttt YY νφππ +−⋅+−  (10) 
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It follows that the slope of the DAS curve is 0>=/ φπ tt dYd . Note also that tt YY =  and 
ttt νππ +−1=  satisfies equation (10). Figure 2 shows three positively-sloped DAS curves—
ODAS , RDAS , and DDAS —for three different predetermined values of 1−tπ —namely, 
*π , 
Rπ , and ρ− , respectively—and zero inflation shock ( 0=tν ). It follows that the heights of these 
three DAS curves at the full-employment output must also be *π , Rπ , and ρ− , respectively, 
as shown. Specifically, point O , at which tt YY =  and 
*= ππ t , must be on ODAS , which is 
the DAS curve when *1 = ππ −t . And point D , at which tt YY =  and ρπ −=t , must be on 
DDAS , which is the DAS curve when ρπ −− =1t . In short, when there are no shocks, the height 
of the DAS curve at full employment is necessarily equal to the previous period’s inflation rate. 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
Following Buttet and Roy (2014), we make the technical assumption that φ , the slope of 
the DAS curve, is smaller than α1/ , the slope of the positively-sloped segment of the DAD 
curve (with ZLB binding): φα >1/ . 
Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibrium 
A short-run equilibrium at any period t  is graphically represented by the intersection of the 
DAD and DAS curves for period t . Figure 2 shows three short-run equilibria—at O , R , and 
D —for the same DAD curve and three different DAS curves. Let us consider these three 
equilibria one by one. 
Unless otherwise specified, we assume that (a) there are no demand or inflation shocks 
( 0== tt νε  for all t ), (b) the full-employment output is constant ( YYt = ), and (c) the 
parameters of the model (α , φ , ρ , πθ , Yθ , 
*π , and Y ) are constant. We do this to focus on 
the dynamic forces of change that are internal or endogenous to the economy (as opposed to 
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change caused by shocks and parameter changes). As we saw in our subsection on the kinked 
DAD curve, under these assumptions, the DAD curve does not shift over time. So, let the DAD 
curve in figure 2 be the economy’s DAD curve in all periods. 
Suppose the economy is in short-run equilibrium in period 1−t  at R ′′  in figure 2.17 
Therefore, Rt ππ =1− . Recall from our subsection on the DAS curve that under our no-shocks 
and constant-parameters assumptions, the height of the DAS curve at the full-employment 
output, Y , is equal to the pre-determined rate of the previous period’s inflation. Therefore, the 
DAS curve in period t  would have to be RDAS  and the short-run equilibrium in period t  
would therefore have to be at R  with inflation at 1=>= −tRrt ππππ . This example illustrates 
the internal dynamics of the DAD–DAS model whereby change can occur—in this case from 
R ′′  at 1−t  to R  at t —even though there are no shocks or parameter changes. (The reader 
can check that the short-run equilibrium at 1+t  will be somewhere between R  and O  on the 
DAD curve and that the economy converges to O  over time.) 
Next, suppose *1 = ππ −t , which is the central bank’s inflation target. Therefore, the DAS 
curve in period t  would have to be ODAS . Therefore, the short-run equilibrium in period t  
would have to be at O  because, as we saw in our subsections on the kinked DAD curve and the 
DAS curve, point O  lies on both DAD  and ODAS . Consequently, 1
* == −tt πππ . In other 
words, O  is a long-run equilibrium, which is a short-run equilibrium that repeats forever, as 
long as there are no shocks or parameter changes. Following Buttet and Roy (2014), we will 
refer to O  as the orthodox long-run equilibrium. 
It can be checked that D  too is a long-run equilibrium. Following Buttet and Roy 
(2014), we will refer to D  as the deflationary long-run equilibrium. 
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Now that we have seen a short-run equilibrium, R , and two long-run equilibria, O  and 
D , we can state the stability results established by Buttet and Roy (2014). They show that if 
ρπ −− >1t , then in subsequent periods inflation and output will converge to 
*π  and Y , 
respectively. That is, if inflation in some period exceeds the negative of the natural real interest 
rate, there’s nothing to worry about as long as there are no shocks and no parameter changes: the 
economy will converge to the orthodox long-run equilibrium at O . 
On the other hand, if ρπ −− <1t , then in subsequent periods, inflation and output will 
decrease indefinitely, moving southwest along the DAD curve away fron D . This is the 
deflationary spiral, an especially undesirable outcome.
18
 
Having discussed the model’s equilibrium and stability properties, we next explain how a 
fall in the natural real interest rate—which is Summers’ definition of secular stagnation—affects 
inflation and output in the short and long runs. 
THE EFFECTS OF A DECREASE IN THE NATURAL RATE 
As the natural real interest rate ρ  does not appear in equation (10), it is clear that changes in 
ρ  cannot shift the DAS curve. Similarly, ρ  does not appear in equation (7), implying that 
changes in ρ  cannot shift the negatively-sloped segment of the DAD curve, which applies 
when the ZLB is not binding. We therefore have the following lemma: 
Lemma 1: When the ZLB is not binding in equilibrium (short-run or long-run), a decline 
in the natural real interest rate has no effect on the DAD and DAS curves. Therefore, the 
short-run equilibrium values of output and inflation are unaffected. 
This result, when coupled with the relevant monetary policy rule 
)()(= * ttYttt YYi −⋅+−⋅++ θππθρπ π , implies that, for any decrease (respectively, increase) in 
the natural rate, ρ , the nominal interest rate decreases (respectively, increases) by the same 
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percentage-point amount. Substituting adaptive expectations (4) into the Fisher equation (3) then 
yields the same result for the real interest rate. In an informal sense, it is this full adjustment of 
the two interest rates, ti  and tr , to changes in ρ  that makes it unnecessary for either output or 
inflation to adjust. 
There are limits, however, to the adjustment of the nominal interest rate to a falling 
natural rate. Although ρ  can decrease indefinitely, the nominal interest rate cannot: it cannot 
fall below zero. Once ti  has been driven down to zero by repeated decreases in ρ , the 
economy will reach the zero lower bound (ZLB). 
For the ZLB case, note that the natural real interest rate ρ  does appear in the equations 
for the ZLB border (6) and the positively-sloped segment of the DAD curve (8). It is 
straightforward to check that a decrease in ρ  shifts both the ZLB border (6) and the 
positively-sloped segment of the DAD curve upward, as shown by the dashed lines in figure 3. It 
is also clear from equation (8) that any decrease (respectively, increase) in ρ  leads to an equal 
upward (respectively, downward) shift in the rising segment of the kinked DAD curve. The 
effects of these shifts on short-run equilibrium are shown in figure 3. The economy is initially at 
Z , but then moves to D′ . 
[Insert figure 3 about here] 
We therefore have the following lemma: 
Lemma 2: When the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is binding in 
equilibrium (short-run or long-run), a decrease in the natural real interest rate ( ↓ρ ) leads to 
decreases in both output and inflation in the short run. 
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To sum up, we have shown that in the short run, a fall in the natural real interest rate has 
no impact on inflation and output when the ZLB is not binding, but leads to declines in inflation 
and output when the ZLB is binding. 
Next, we show that a decrease in the natural real interest rate brings the (unstable) 
deflationary long-run equilibrium closer to the (stable) orthodox long-run equilibrium, and 
thereby it increases the likelihood that a demand and/or inflation shock might push the economy 
from the (stable) orthodox long-run equilibrium into a deflationary spiral. 
Proposition 1: A decrease in the natural real interest rate makes an economy more 
vulnerable to a deflationary spiral in the sense that the minimum size, in absolute value, that a 
demand or inflation shock would have to be in order to be big enough to initiate a deflationary 
spiral becomes smaller when the natural real interest rate decreases. 
As in figure 1, let the DAD curve in figure 4 initially be OKD . Note that the DAD and 
DAS curves intersect at O , indicating that the economy is initially at the orthodox long-run 
equilibrium with YYt =  and 
*= ππ t . 
Now, consider a decrease in the natural or long-run real interest rate from 1ρ  to 
12 < ρρ . As in figure 3, the DAD curve shifts from OKD  to DKO ′′ . The deflationary long-run 
equilibrium shifts from D  to D′ , coming closer to O , the orthodox long-run equilibrium. 
From the equations (7) and (8), for the negatively-sloped and positively-sloped segments 
of the kinked DAD curve, and from equation (6) for the ZLB border, it is straightforward to 
check that an adverse demand shock—a decrease in tε —shifts the kinked DAD curve to the left 
and leaves the ZLB border unaffected.
19
 So, when 1= ρρ , if there is a big enough negative 
demand shock, the DAD curve could shift just to the left of 2DAD  in figure 4, and thereby 
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precipitate a deflationary spiral by reducing the inflation rate below 1ρ− .
20
 On the other hand, 
when 2= ρρ , the demand shock would only need to be big enough to shift the DAD curve to 
the left of 3DAD . In other words, a fall in the natural real interest rate makes the economy more 
vulnerable to a deflationary spiral because it reduces the size of the adverse demand shock that is 
just big enough to start a deflationary spiral. 
[Insert figure 4 about here] 
We now consider the effect of an inflation shock in figure 5. Recall from the section on 
the DAS curve that a negative inflation shock ( 0<tν ) leads to a vertically downward shift of the 
DAS curve. When 1= ρρ , a big enough negative (that is, favorable) inflation shock could take 
the DAS curve to somewhere below 2DAS , which would reduce inflation below 1ρ− , and 
thereby initiate a deflationary spiral. But when 12 <= ρρρ , a smaller inflation shock would be 
able to initiate a deflationary spiral, because the DAS curve would have to be pushed down only 
somewhere below 3DAS . 
[Insert figure 5 about here] 
Finally, consider an extreme scenario where the natural real interest rate decreases to 
such an extent that ρπ −=* . Then the two long-run equilibria collapse into the same long-run 
equilibrium. In figure 6, this case is represented by the DAD curve 2AOE . Here O  is still the 
long-run equilibrium in the sense that an economy at O  remains at O  in the absence of 
shocks, parameter changes, and policy changes. However, this long-run equilibrium is neither 
stable nor unstable. If 2
*
1 => ρππ −−t , then the economy will converge to O  (in the absence 
of any further shocks, parameter changes, and policy changes). However, if 2
*
1 =< ρππ −−t , 
then a deflationary spiral will take the economy away from O . 
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[Insert figure 6 about here] 
If ρ  falls further to 3ρ , then 
*
3 > πρ−  and the DAD curve becomes 33EAK  in 
figure 6. In this case, there are no long-run equilibria. For all values of 1−tπ , the economy will 
be in a deflationary spiral (in the absence of any further shocks, parameter changes, and policy 
changes). 
As we will show in the next section, the good news is that this extreme case can be 
avoided by steadily raising the central bank’s inflation target ( *π ) whenever the natural real 
interest rate falls, thereby ensuring that ρ−  would never catch up to *π . 
RAISING THE INFLATION TARGET TO NEUTRALIZE DECREASES 
IN THE NATURAL RATE 
We have just seen in figures 4 and 5 that a decline in the natural real interest rate brings the 
(unstable) deflationary long-run equilibrium closer to the (stable) orthodox long-run equilibrium, 
thereby increasing the danger that a demand or inflation shock might push the economy from the 
orthodox long-run equilibrium into a deflationary spiral. An obvious solution is to move the 
orthodox long-run equilibrium in response to every move of the deflationary long-run 
equilibrium in such a way that a constant distance is maintained between the two. 
While a decrease in ρ  raises the positively-sloped segment of the DAD curve (8) by the 
same percentage-point amount and leaves the negatively-sloped segment (7) unaffected, it can be 
easily checked that an increase in *π  raises the negatively-sloped segment by the same 
percentage-point amount and leaves the positively-sloped segment unaffected. Therefore, as 
shown in figure 7, if ρ  decreases by ∆  percentage points and, simultaneously, *π  increases 
by ∆  percentage points, then the DAD curve will shift from DAD  (or, OKD ) to 2DAD  (or, 
DKO ′′′′ ). Therefore, while the deflationary long-run equilibrium will move from D  to D′ , the 
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orthodox long-run equilibrium will move from O  to O′ . In this way, an increase in the central 
bank’s inflation target insulates the economy from the increased risk of a deflationary spiral 
associated with a decrease in the natural real interest rate. 
[Insert figure 7 about here] 
We thus have the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Although a decrease in the natural real interest rate increases an 
economy’s vulnerability to a deflationary spiral, the threat would be neutralized if the central 
bank raises its target inflation rate by the same percentage-point amount as the decrease in the 
natural real interest rate. 
To see the irony in this result, consider an economy that is safely ensconced at the 
orthodox long-run equilibrium with YYt =  and 
*= ππ t , and then imagine steady decreases in 
ρ . As we saw in lemma 1, output and inflation would be unaffected and no danger would be 
apparent. Nevertheless, the probability that a sudden shock would push the economy into a 
deflationary spiral would be rising all the while, in an invisible, subterranean way. Therefore, our 
analysis suggests that decreases in the natural real interest rate should be counteracted with 
matching increases in the central bank’s inflation target even when output is at full employment 
and inflation satisfies the central bank’s inflation target. 
Another notable point is that a negative natural real interest rate makes it possible for an 
economy to be in a deflationary spiral even when there is no deflation! The natural real interest 
rate could very well drop to negative levels, as indeed our estimates in our section on motivating 
evidence suggest it did in the post-2009 United States. Therefore, ρ− , the critical rate of 
inflation at which a deflationary spiral is triggered, could be positive. In such a situation, 
inflation could be positive, and yet be low enough to trigger a deflationary spiral! 
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As the estimates in Laubach and Williams (2003) and our own estimates in this article 
suggest, the natural real interest rate has been falling in the United States since the 1980s. But 
nobody saw any reason for worry at the time because output and inflation were doing fine. Our 
lemma 1 explains why decreases in the natural real interest rate did not affect the economy back 
then: because the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate was not binding before 
December 2008. But our proposition 1 argues that the decrease in the natural real interest rate 
back in the pre-December 2008 period was making the economy more and more vulnerable to a 
deflationary spiral even though there was no visible impact on output and inflation at the time. 
And, as our proposition 2 argues, matching increases in the Fed’s inflation target should have 
been implemented in the placid period before 2008. 
Put another way, central banks should question the strategy of keeping inflation stable 
over the long run and consider instead a strategy of keeping the nominal interest rate stable over 
the long run. To see why, recall that YYt =  and 
*= ππ t  in the stable orthodox long-run 
equilibrium. Then, from (2), the real interest rate in this equilibrium is ρ=tr , and, by (5), the 
nominal interest rate is *== πρπ ++ ttt ri . In line with our argument that decreases in ρ  
should be matched by equal increases in *π , it follows that *πρ +  should be kept constant. In 
other words, instead of keeping inflation stable over the long run, central banks should consider 
keeping the nominal interest rate stable over the long run. 
These are new ideas in intermediate macroeconomics that follow from a standard model 
in a standard textbook. And these ideas can be taught to intermediate macroeconomics students 
using standard graphical and algebraic techniques. 
Finally, let us briefly consider how an economy that is in the orthodox long-run 





Suppose at time t  the DAD curve is OKD  in figure 7, the DAS is ODAS , and the 
economy is therefore at the (stable) orthodox long-run equilibrium at O . Therefore, at t , output 
is YYt =  and inflation is 
*= ππ t . At time 1+t , the DAS curve would still be ODAS . (Recall 
from our subsection on the DAS curve that the height of the DAS curve at the full-employment 
output is the previous period’s inflation, assuming no shocks.) However, the DAD curve at 1+t  
would be 2DAD , following the simultaneous decrease in ρ  by ∆  percentage points and an 
equal increase in *π . Therefore, the short-run equilibrium at 1+t  would be at R , with 
tt YYY =>1+  and tt πππ =>
*
1+ . 
In subsequent periods, it can be shown, by following the reasoning by which we showed 
the movement of the economy from R ′′  to R  in figure 2 in our subsection on the DAS curve, 
that the economy will over time move from R  towards O′ , the new (stable) orthodox long-run 
equilibrium, along KO ′′′ . 
In short, when the central bank raises its inflation target, the economy will go 
immediately from O  to R  and, then gradually, from R  to O′ . Output will rise above—and 
then return to—the full-employment level. Inflation will rise gradually from *π  to ∆+*π . 
As for the interest rates, it can be shown that the real interest rate will fall from ρ=tr  in 
the initial orthodox long-run equilibrium, by more than ∆  percentage points, to ∆−+ ρ<1tr  
and then steadily increase to the new stable level of ∆−ρ . The nominal interest rate will also 
fall from *= πρ +ti  in the initial orthodox long-run equilibrium and then steadily increase to 




We have argued that changes in the natural real interest rate have important implications for the 
conduct of macroeconomic stabilization. We have made our argument using the DAD–DAS 
model in Mankiw (2013, chapter 15), modified to incorporate the zero lower bound on nominal 
interest rates. One key prescription for monetary policy that emerges from our analysis is that a 
prudent central bank should raise its target inflation rate when the natural real interest rate 
decreases, irrespective of whether the ZLB is binding or not. A higher target inflation insulates 
the economy from adverse demand shocks and favorable inflation shocks that could trigger a 
deflationary spiral. 
We end by discussing two issues that have been mentioned in recent debates, but are not 
discussed in our article. First, Summers (2013) has argued that attempts to fight negative real 
interest rates by raising the target inflation will lead to asset price bubbles and related financial 
instability. Krugman (2013) and Kocherlakota (2014) have argued that a separate set of 
policies—called macroprudential policies—aimed directly at the regulation of financial markets 
are appropriate ways of addressing Summers’ concerns. 
Finally, both Summers (2013) and Krugman (2013) have argued in favor of prolonged 
fiscal stimulus as a response to secular stagnation. While aware that such fiscal stimulus would 
require government borrowing and increasing levels of government debt, both have argued that, 
when real interest rates are lower than the growth rate of real GDP, prolonged government 
borrowing may be possible without any increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio, and should therefore 
be considered safe. 
While we accept the importance of the issues summarized in the last two paragraphs, we 
were unable to address them formally in the model that we have used in this article. Our goal 
throughout has been to take a topic that is at the center of current macroeconomic debate—how 
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to conduct monetary policy when real rates are decreasing—and show that a formal analysis of it 







 See Summers (2014a) and the collection of papers in Teulings and Baldwin (2014). 
2
 Current editions of prominent intermediate macroeconomics textbooks (e.g., Mankiw 2013; 
Blanchard and Johnson 2013; Jones 2011; and Mishkin 2011) all discuss the ZLB, and all make 
the point that expansionary fiscal policy works at the ZLB whereas expansionary monetary 
policy (at least of the conventional kind) does not. However, these textbooks do not explain the 
implications for macroeconomic stabilization of changes in the natural real interest rate. Carlin 
and Soskice (2015, Section 3.3.3) provide a detailed account of the deflationary spiral. 
3
 The positively-sloped segment of the DAD curve captures the idea that falling inflation is a 
special nightmare at the ZLB. As nominal interest rates cannot be reduced any further, any 
decline in inflation means an increase in the real interest rate, which in turn reduces aggregate 
demand and output. 
4
 Several central banks, including the Swiss National Bank, the European Central Bank, and the 
Danish National Bank have recently adopted a negative nominal interest rate policy and as a 
result, the zero lower bound is not a firm lower bound. Negative nominal interest rates are not an 
issue for our analysis, however, because the only assumption needed for our theoretical results to 
carry through is that nominal interest rates are bounded from below. The floor value, whether 
positive or negative, is inconsequential. The negative nominal interest rates charged by banks 
reflect the cost of storage and, because of competitive pressure; this cost is unlikely to become 
much greater than 1 percent of deposit, thereby creating a floor on nominal interest rates 





 In the extreme scenario where the natural real interest rate has fallen into negative territory, the 
economy could experience a deflationary spiral even though current inflation is positive (and 
presumably low). 
6
 Fiscal stimulus also can reverse a deflationary spiral, as shown in Buttet and Roy (2014). But 
tax cuts and/or increases in government purchases necessarily require increases in government 
borrowing, which may not always be an available option, especially in a weak economy and 
especially if the government has already piled up so large a debt that private lenders would be 
leery of lending it more. Therefore, there is a need to avoid getting into a deflationary spiral in 
the first place, and to avoid a deflationary spiral tomorrow, it’s necessary to ensure that today’s 
inflation stays above the negative of the natural real interest rate, which is the danger level. 
7
 Chadha and Perlman (2014) who analyze the Gibson Paradox note that, in the presence of an 
uncertain natural rate, the need to stabilize the banking sector’s reserve ratio can lead to 
persistent deviations of the market rate of interest from its natural level and consequently 
long-run swings in the price level. 
8
 Note that real interest rates have been declining in the United States since the 1980s with 
steady decreases in the estimated natural real interest rate. But central banks have not raised their 
inflation targets during that period. (Even the Bank of Japan’s recent move in this direction was 
to increase its inflation target from 2 percent to a mere 3 percent.) This unwillingness needs to be 
re-examined in the light of our article. 
9
 In his address to the National Association for Business Economics and elsewhere, Summers 
(2014a) cautions that even though the zero lower is not technically binding, low nominal and real 
interest rates undermine financial stability in various ways. The financial stability channel is not 





 Eichengreen (2014) emphasizes four different causes of secular stagnation in his review 
essay: slower growth of technological progress (Gordon 2014), stagnant aggregate demand 
(Summers 2014b; Krugman 2014), the failure of countries like the United States to invest in 
infrastructure, education and training, and finally atrophy of skills caused by long-term 
unemployment and forgone on-the-job training (Crafts 1989; Gordon and Krenn 2010). We 
believe that it would be very hard, let alone desirable, to write an article, which encompasses all 
aspects of secular stagnation, so we focus on analyzing only one aspect of secular stagnation. 
11
 A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) report (IMF 2014) cites three main reasons for 
the decline in real rates since the mid-1980s: a) higher saving rates in emerging market 
economies, b) greater demand for safe assets reflecting the rapid reserve accumulation of 
emerging market economies as well as increased riskiness of equity relative to bonds, and c) a 
sharp and persistent decline in investment rates in advanced economies since the global financial 
crisis. All three factors lead to greater saving propensities and lower investment propensities. 
12
 Knut Wicksell (1898/1936, 102) offers the following definition for the natural real interest 
rate: “There is a certain rate of interest on loans which is neutral in respect to commodity prices, 
and tends neither to raise nor to lower them. This is necessarily the same as the rate of interest 
which would be determined by supply and demand if no use were made of money and all lending 
were effected in the form of real capital goods.” More recently, Kocherlakota (2014) refers to the 
natural real interest rate as the mandate-consistent real interest rate. 
13
 Laubach and Williams (2003) use maximum likelihood to estimate changes in natural real 
interest rate over time, while the equilibrium results in Barsky, Justiniano, and Melosi (2014) are 
derived from solving a dynamic utility-maximization problem. We believe that the technical and 




skill set that students possess when they take their intermediate macroeconomics courses at most 
colleges. 
14
 There are potential econometric issues with estimating changes in the natural rate using 
equation (1), such as co-integration of the variables, which could affect our estimates for the 
natural rate of interest. For the sake of space, however, and because our article proposes an 
innovation for intermediate macroeconomics courses, we do not discuss econometric issues 
related to estimating changes in the natural real interest rate here. Rather, we leave this 
discussion for an upper elective course on econometrics or time series analysis. 
15
 Note that an increase in the real interest rate leads to a decrease in aggregate demand, as in the 
standard IS curve. For the graphical analysis in the rest of the article, we will make the 
simplifying assumption: …for all…. 
16
 The negative feedback loop between output and inflation is the mechanism that leads to a 
deflation-induced depression, as previously explained by Fisher (1933) and Krugman (1998). In 
normal times, when nominal interest rates are positive, the central bank can afford to cut interest 
rates following a negative demand shock to provide short-run stimulus to the economy. When 
the zero lower bound is binding, however, cutting rates is not feasible and real interest rates spike 
up as a result of lower inflation. Higher real interest rates in turn depress the economy further, 
which put further pressure on real rates, which depress the economy further, and so on and so 
forth. 
17
 The DAS curve through R ′′ has not been drawn for simplicity. 
18
 To see the logic behind the unstable nature of the deflationary long-run equilibrium, D, and 
the deflationary spiral, see pages 46 and 47 of Buttet and Roy (2014). We saw above in figure 2 




subsequent periods. It is straightforward to see the workings of the deflationary spiral by 
repeating that analysis, but starting at D′  instead of R ′′ . Buttet and Roy (2014) emphasize the 
need to keep inflation above ρ− , and discuss how fiscal and monetary policy can be used (a) to 
stop inflation from falling below ρ−  and thereby precipitating a deflationary spiral, and (b) to 
raise inflation above ρ−  after it has already fallen below that level, thereby ending the 
deflationary spiral. They show that the only way out of a deflationary spiral once it has begun is 
fiscal stimulus. Now, fiscal stimulus usually involves a tax cut or an increase in government 
purchases or both, and this usually requires an increase in government borrowing. And such 
borrowing, especially in conditions of economic weakness, may not be possible, especially for a 
government that has already borrowed a lot and is, therefore, treated warily by private lenders. 
That is why it is crucial that ρπ −− <1t  be avoided at all costs. 
19
 See figure 2 of Buttet and Roy (2014) for a more detailed explanation. 
20
 Recall our discussion of the stability result in Buttet and Roy (2014): if inflation falls below 
the negative of the natural real interest rate, the economy will thereafter be in a deflationary 
spiral (if there are no further shocks or parameter changes), with output and inflation falling 
repeatedly. 
21
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TABLE 1: The Natural Real Interest Rate, 1981-2013 
Quarterly data (std error in parenthesis) 
Decade   
 N 
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All: 1981–2013  0.0240 (0.0021)  −6.88
10−6 (6.5
10−6 





FIGURE 1: The Kinked DAD Curve is shown here. It is assumed that 0=tε  and YYt =  for 
all t. The negatively-sloped segment of the DAD curve satisfies equation (7), the 





FIGURE 2: Points O and D are long-run equilibria, while point R is a short-run 
equilibrium. Both shocks are assumed zero. The DAS curves all satisfy equation (10) but for 
different levels of the previous period’s inflation. Note that the height of a DAS curve at Y , the 





FIGURE 3: The effect of a fall in the natural rate ( ↓ρ ) on output and inflation is shown here. 
It is assumed that 0=tε  and YYt =  for all t . A falling ρ  has no effect on the orthodox 
long-run equilibrium, O, but moves the deflationary long-run equilibrium from D to D′ , thereby 
bringing the deflationary equilibrium closer to the orthodox equilibrium. The short-run 
equilibrium moves from Z to D′ , implying decreases in both output and inflation. Had the 






FIGURE 4: The Natural Real Interest Rate and the Deflationary Spiral—Demand Shock: A 
fall in the natural real interest rate makes the economy more vulnerable to a deflationary 
spiral. It is assumed that 0=tν  and YYt =  for all t. When the natural real interest rate 
decreases, the adverse demand shock that can tip the economy into a deflationary spiral becomes 
smaller. When 1= ρρ , a deflationary spiral can be initiated by the DAD curve moving to the left 
of DAD2. On the other hand when 12 <= ρρρ , the DAD curve would need to move only to the 





FIGURE 5: The Natural Real Interest Rate and the Deflationary Spiral—Inflation Shock: A 
fall in the natural real interest rate makes the economy more vulnerable to a deflationary 
spiral. It is assumed that 0=tε  and YYt =  for all t. When the natural real interest rate 
decreases from 1ρ  to 2ρ , the deflationary long-run equilibrium moves from D to D′ . When 
1= ρρ , a favorable inflation shock can initiate a deflationary spiral by moving the DAS curve to 






FIGURE 6: If ρ  falls to *π−  or below, the economy has either one 
neither-stable-nor-unstable long-run equilibrium or no long-run equilibrium. It is assumed 
that 0== tt νε  and YYt =  for all t. As the natural real interest rate falls from 0ρ  to 01 < ρρ  
to 2ρ  to 3ρ , the DAD curve shifts from AKE to AK1E1 to AOE2 to AK3E3. For each of the first 
two, there are two long-run equilibria: O which is stable and the other unstable. For AOE2, O is 
the only long-run equilibrium, and it is neither stable nor unstable. When the DAD curve is 





FIGURE 7: An effective way to neutralize a fall in the natural real interest rate is to raise 
the central bank’s inflation target. It is assumed that 0== tt νε , YYt =  for all t, and 0>∆ . 
When the natural real interest rate decreases from ρ  to ∆−ρ , the deflationary long-run 
equilibrium moves from D to D′ , coming closer to the stable long-run equilibrium, O, and 
increasing the chance that a shock would push the economy into a deflationary spiral. However, 
an increase in the central bank’s target inflation from *π  to ∆+*π  maintains the distance 
between the two long-run equilibria and therefore does not allow the economy to become more 
vulnerable to a deflationary spiral when the natural real interest rate decreases. 
